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After the National Academy of Sciences issued a stunning report in 
2009 on the unscientific state of many forensic science subfields, forensic 
science has undergone internal and external scrutiny that it had managed 
to avoid for decades.  Although some reform efforts are underway, forensic 
science writ large has yet to embrace and settle upon an empirical research 
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agenda that addresses knowledge gaps pertaining to the reliability of its 
methods.  Our paper addresses this problem by proposing a preliminary set 
of fourteen empirical studies for the forensic sciences.  Following a brief 
discussion of the courtroom treatment of forensic science evidence, we 
sketch a series of studies that should be conducted to increase 
understanding of what forensic examiners are doing, how accurately they 
are doing it, and how cognitive bias may affect the work product.  We also 
propose several studies that examine how the specific questions examiners 
are asked might affect the validity and persuasiveness of examiners’ 
responses.  We conclude by affirming the importance of developing a 
research culture within the forensic sciences that includes a commitment to 
conducting, participating in, and relying upon high quality empirical 
research. 
Keywords: Empirical, Forensic science, Judicial decision making, 
Juries, Scientific evidence 
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INTRODUCTION 
John and Sally Sweek were brutally stabbed to death in Texas in 
1987.1  Steven Chaney was charged with their murder.2  While Chaney 
knew the victims and there was evidence that Chaney owed the Sweeks 
approximately $500 for drugs, the key evidence against Chaney was a bite 
mark on John Sweek’s arm.3  Two forensic dentists testified that Chaney’s 
teeth matched the bite mark.4  One of the dentists said that there was just “1 
to a million chance” that someone other than Chaney was the source of the 
bite mark.5  Chaney was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.  On 
October 12, 2015, after spending the previous twenty-eight years in prison, 
Steven Chaney’s conviction was reversed after a court concluded that the 
bite mark testimony was junk science.6  Even the dentist, who thought it 
was practically impossible that anyone other than Chaney was the biter, 
now believes that his own testimony was unfounded.7 
 
1  Chaney v. State, 775 S.W.2d 722, 723–24 (Tex. App. 1989). 
2  Id. at 724–25. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 725–26. 
5  Brandi Grissom, Junk Science Cited in Bid to Clear Man in ‘89 Dallas Killing, THE 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/
20151010-junk-science-cited-in-bid-to-clear-man-in-89-dallas-killing.ece. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. (discussing an affidavit filed in 2015 in which the dental expert who had offered the 
“1 to a million chance” claim in 1987 wrote, “[c]onclusions that a particular individual is the 
biter and their dentition is a match when you are dealing with an open population are now 
understood to be scientifically unsound.”). 
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Although trial courts have routinely admitted bite mark evidence for 
decades,8 Chaney was the twenty-sixth person since 2000 whose conviction 
was released or indictment dismissed based on discredited bite mark 
testimony.9 
In February 2016, just a few months after Chaney’s release, the Texas 
Forensic Science Commission called for an end to the use of bite mark 
evidence in criminal trials.10  According to the New York Times, the 
Commission concluded that “the validity of the technique has not been 
scientifically established.”11  That is an understatement.  According to a 
2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report, “[a]lthough the majority 
of forensic odontologists are satisfied that bite marks can demonstrate 
sufficient detail for positive identification, no scientific studies support this 
assessment, and no large population studies have been conducted.”12  Bite 
mark analysis has not fared any better in studies conducted since this NAS 
report appeared.  A 2015 study showed that experienced, certified forensic 
odontologists often disagreed both about who was the source of a bite mark 
in a crime scene photograph and whether the marking in question was a bite 
mark at all.13 
The research community has long known that the scientific basis for 
bite mark analysis is thin.14  Why, then, do courts routinely admit this 
 
8  Paul C. Giannelli, Bite Mark Analysis, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 930, 943–45 (2007). 
9  Dallas District Attorney and Innocence Project Move to Reverse Conviction Based on 
False Bite Mark Testimony, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.innocence 
project.org/news-events-exonerations/dallas-district-attorney-and-innocence-project-move-
to-reverse-conviction-based-on-false-bite-mark-testimony. 
10  ERIK ECKHOLM, Texas Panel Calls for an End to Criminal IDs via Bite Mark, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/us/texas-panel-calls-for-an-end-
to-criminal-ids-via-bite-mark.html. 
11  Id. 
12  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 87, 176 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report]; see also Iain A. Pretty 
& David Sweet, The Scientific Basis of Human Bite Mark Analyses – A Critical Review, 41 
SCI. & JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in 
European, Oceanic, and North American Courts, the fundamental scientific basis for 
bitemark analysis has never been established.”). 
13  Adam J. Freeman & Iain A. Pretty, Construct Validity of Bitemark Assessments Using 
the ABFO Decision Tree, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCI. ANN. MEETING (Feb. 19, 2015).  The 
method and results of this as yet unpublished study are discussed in an amicus curiae brief in 
Richards v. Fox, No. S223651(Cal. 2015) (brief available at 2015 WL 5779457).  According 
to the amicus curiae brief, thirty-nine examiners in the study reviewed injuries depicted in 
100 crime scene photographs. In only four of the 100 cases did all examiners agree on 
whether an injury was a bite mark or not.  In seventy-one of the 100 cases, less than 70% of 
the forensic odontologists agreed about whether the injury was or was not a bite mark. 
14  Pretty & Sweet, supra note 12, at 86 (“The fundamental scientific basis for bite mark 
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evidence15 and permit testimony of the sort that led to the conviction of 
Steven Chaney?  Is there something about bite mark evidence in particular 
that has fooled courts into treating it as reliable science?  Or is the problem 
a more general one pertaining to the beliefs that people have about the 
reliability and accuracy of forensic science16 evidence?  In our view, the 
available evidence supports the latter conclusion.  Although bite mark 
analysis is surely among the weakest of the forensic sciences,17 it is not the 
only forensic science that lacks a sufficient scientific foundation to connect 
an evidentiary sample to its source.18 
The idea that many forensic sciences lack a sufficient scientific 
foundation is not original with us, nor is this the takeaway point of our 
paper.  Instead, we offer the untested nature of many of the forensic 
sciences as motivation for recommending a series of scientific studies that 
may provide guidance to legal decision makers about the reliability and 
validity of forensic science conclusions. In calling for additional research, 
our target audience is not so much those who have already made up their 
minds about the value of forensic science evidence as it is those who want 
and need to know what forensic methods can and cannot achieve in practice 
and how to evaluate the strength of forensic evidence, as promoted by 
unbiased, empirical data. 
In September 2010, the National Science Foundation sponsored a two-
day workshop on forensic science and cognitive bias at Northwestern Law 
School.19  Many of the workshop participants were experimental 
psychologists with expertise in conducting studies that describe and 
 
analysis has never been established.”); see also Brief for Michael J. Saks, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re William Richards on Habeas Corpus, No. S223651, 2015 
WL 5779457 at *45 (Cal. 2015) (“The claims of forensic dentistry have for decades outrun 
empirical testing of those claims. Rather than confirming the field’s claims, recent 
research . . . has confirmed that the foundations of bite mark identification are unsound.”). 
15  Id. at 86. 
16  Forensic science is the application of science to legal matters.  Forensic science 
identification techniques include DNA analysis, fingerprints, handwriting analysis, bite 
marks, hair and fiber analyses, ballistics, tool marks, etc.  See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, 
CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 4 (10th ed. 2011). 
17  NAS Report, supra note 12, at 176 (referring to “the inherent weaknesses involved in 
bite mark comparison”). 
18  Id. (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of 
certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”). 
19  See JONATHAN J. KOEHLER & JOHN B. MEIXNER, WORKSHOP ON COGNITIVE BIAS AND 
FORENSIC SCIENCE, FINAL REPORT 8 (Aug. 7, 2013), www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/
conferences/workshops/cognitivebias/documents/NSFWorkshopReportFinal.pdf (explaining 
cognitive biases are “systematic distortions in thinking that occur when information passes 
through the subjective filters of human beliefs, attitudes, and experiences”).   
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improve upon human judgment and decision making.  A primary goal of 
that gathering was to identify the role that the natural limits and biases of 
human decision makers play in the forensic science process.  In thinking 
about the type of empirical research in forensic science that would be most 
helpful, we drew liberally on the ideas and proposals offered at this 
workshop. 
Our paper is organized as follows: Section I provides background 
information on the admission of forensic science evidence in court and 
recent developments that have spurred calls for reform.  Section II proposes 
a series of scientific studies that consider what exactly examiners are doing, 
how accurately they are doing it, and how cognitive bias may affect an 
examiner’s work.  Section II also proposes several studies that examine 
how the particular questions that examiners are asked affect the scientific 
validity of their responses and how factfinders weigh these responses.  Part 
III concludes with a call to make the empirical studies we propose here part 
of the forensic reform efforts that are under way. 
I. HISTORY 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,20 the U.S. Supreme 
Court introduced a new standard for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence.21  Drawing on Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Daubert held that 
the “trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”22  According to the court, the 
hallmark of scientific knowledge is its reliability,23 and so it stands to 
reason that courts should require proof that the principles and methods that 
lie behind scientific evidence and testimony are demonstrably reliable.  
Daubert also provided general guidance for trial judges on how they might 
go about assessing the reliability of proffered scientific evidence.  These so-
called Daubert factors are nonexclusive and include a consideration of (a) 
the extent to which the underlying scientific theory has been tested, (b) the 
existence of peer-reviewed publications, (c) the “known or potential rate of 
error” of the method, (d) the existence of “standards controlling the 
technique’s operation,” and (e) general acceptance within the scientific 
 
20  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
21  Id. at 593–94. 
22  Id. at 589. 
23  When it referred to the “reliability” of scientific evidence or scientific knowledge, the 
Court had in mind something more akin to what scientists refer to as validity.  That is, 
reliable knowledge, according to the Court, is knowledge that is valid and can be trusted. See 
id. at 590 n.9 (discussing “evidentiary reliability” and its relationship to validity).  
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community.24 
However, as noted in the 2009 NAS Report, “[r]eview of reported 
judicial opinions reveals that, at least in criminal cases, forensic science 
evidence is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the standard of reliability 
enunciated in Daubert.”25  Indeed, trial courts typically rely on the long 
history of admitting various types of forensic science evidence, and 
essentially give this type of evidence a pass when it comes to proof of 
reliability.26 
At the same time, it is undeniably true that a paradigm shift is 
underway in the criminal justice system with respect to forensic science 
evidence.27  Forensic science results no longer have the same aura of 
infallibility that they had as recently as a decade ago.  Crime lab scandals, 
fraud, unsupported assumptions, high profile errors, and wrongful 
convictions that point to faulty forensic techniques and testimony at the trial 
level have all contributed to a national movement to investigate and 
reassess the value of different types of forensic science evidence.28  As 
evidence of the paradigm shift, in 2013, the U.S. Government established 
the National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS).29  NCFS is charged 
 
24  Id. at 593–94. 
25  NAS Report, supra note 12, at 106. The same may not be true for civil cases. See D. 
Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being 
Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (arguing that the heightened scrutiny of 
scientific evidence Daubert requires has continued to expand in civil, but not criminal, 
cases); see also NAS Report, supra note 12, at 98 (“[I]ronically, the appellate courts appear 
to be more willing to second-guess trial court judgments on the admissibility of purported 
scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases.”). 
26  Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from 
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1216–19 (2004) 
(arguing that fingerprint evidence has never been scrutinized by trial courts using the 
Daubert factors because this type of evidence was too important to the criminal justice 
system to risk being ruled inadmissible). 
27  Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892, 895 (2005) (describing “a paradigm shift in the 
traditional forensic identification sciences in which untested assumptions and semi-informed 
guesswork are replaced by a sound scientific foundation and justifiable protocols”); M. Chris 
Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s Overdue 
Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2016) (“[T]he predicted paradigm shift 
has occurred.”). 
28  NAS Report, supra note 12, at 44 (“In recent years, the integrity of crime laboratories 
increasingly has been called into question, with some highly publicized cases highlighting 
the sometimes lax standards of laboratories that have generated questionable or fraudulent 
evidence and that have lacked quality control measures that would have detected the 
questionable evidence.”). 
29  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs (last visited May 23, 2016). 
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with making policy recommendations to the Department of Justice that will 
improve the “validity and reliability of the forensic sciences.”30  Though it 
is still too early to know how NCFS will change the forensic science 
landscape, early indications point to a focus on eliminating exaggerated, 
unproven, and unscientific claims that have been made about forensic 
science evidence.31 
II.  WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
With or without assistance from trial courts, forensic science in the 
United States is undergoing a kind of internal and external scrutiny that it 
has avoided for decades.  Reform efforts to date from the NCFS have 
focused largely on quality management,32 laboratory accreditation,33 
ethics,34 system upgrades,35 curriculum development,36 awareness of 
potential biases,37 and providing more cautious scientific conclusions in 
 
30  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, CHARTER 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/624216/download./file/624216/download. 
31  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
REGARDING USE OF THE TERM “REASONABLE SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY,” FINAL DRAFT (Mar. 3, 
2016), http://www.ascld.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Final-Draft-Recs-Doc-on-The-Use
-of-The-Term-Reasonable-Scientific-CertaiFalsepdf (“Forensic discipline conclusions are 
often testified to as being held ‘to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty’ or ‘to a 
reasonable degree of [discipline] certainty.’ These terms have no scientific meaning and may 
mislead factfinders about the level of objectivity involved in the analysis . . . . The Attorney 
General should direct all attorneys appearing on behalf of the Department of Justice (a) to 
forego use of these phrases when presenting forensic discipline testimony . . . .”); NAT’L 
COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., DRAFT POLICY RECOMMENDATION ON EXPERT TESTIMONY 2 (Oct. 
12, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/10/15/draft_on
_expert_testimony.pdf (“Experts should not use misleading terms that suggest that the 
methodology or the expert is infallible when testifying.”). 
32  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
REGARDING TRANSPARENCY OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTS (Mar. 22, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/839706/download. 
33  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION REGARDING CRITICAL 
STEPS TO ACCREDITATION (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/839701/
download. 
34  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NATIONAL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE AND FORENSIC 
MEDICINE SERVICE PROVIDERS (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/839711/
download. 
35  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., DIRECTIVE RECOMMENDATION: AUTOMATED 
FINGERPRINT INFORMATION SYSTEMS (AFIS) INTEROPERABILITY (Aug. 11, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/786576/download. 
36  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., FORENSIC SCIENCE CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 
(Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/818206/download. 
37  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., ENSURING THAT FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED 
UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/
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reports and testimony.38  While these reform efforts are important, they 
have not focused on creating a body of knowledge about the various 
forensic sciences that legal decision makers need. What are the best forensic 
examiners doing?  What is the probative value of forensic conclusions? 
What are the factors that affect the accuracy of forensic conclusions or the 
confidence with which examiners defend their conclusions?  How, if at all, 
do the non-forensic contextual features of a case affect forensic 
conclusions?  Are legal decision makers affected by the manner in which 
forensic scientists describe their findings?  These types of questions are best 
addressed by empirical study. 
Various types of empirical studies may be used to address these 
questions.  Field studies, field experiments, experimental simulations, and 
laboratory experiments are several options.  In a field study, the researcher 
makes systematic observations within the naturally occurring system under 
study.39  Exploratory studies that examine how forensic examiners conduct 
their analyses could use this approach.  A field experiment is similar to a 
field study, but here the researcher deliberately manipulates one or more 
variables and then measures its effect on one or more dependent variables.40  
For example, if one group of fingerprint examiners working on a case was 
told that Suspect #1 had not confessed, whereas another group of examiners 
was told instead that Suspect #2 had confessed, a field experiment could 
measure the effect of the confessions on the examiners’ judgments.  An 
experimental simulation involves constructing a setting that captures a 
naturally-occurring setting.41  It is similar to a field experiment in that the 
researchers manipulate one or more variables.  However, the researcher 
conducting a field experiment is also responsible for recreating a setting 
that appears naturally.  In a laboratory experiment, the researcher does not 
try to recreate a naturally occurring setting.  Instead, the researcher creates 
an artificial setting that permits a close examination of various measured 
variables and other potential causal variables.42  The focus in a laboratory 
experiment is more on internal validity (i.e., our confidence that the 
manipulated variable caused a change in the measured variable) than 
external validity (i.e., our confidence that the study’s result generalizes to 
other situations and people). 
 
818196/download. 
38  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 31.  
39  PHILIP J. RUNKEL & JOSEPH E. MCGRATH, RESEARCH ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR: A 
SYSTEMIC GUIDE TO METHOD 1, 90 (1972). 
40  Id. at 94–95. 
41  Id. at 96. 
42  Id.  
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All of these types of studies have scientific merit and all of them can 
be used to expand our knowledge about the forensic sciences.  In the 
sections below, we briefly describe fourteen scientific studies that could and 
should be conducted in support of this goal. 
DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES: EXAMINER METHODS 
Most of the studies we suggest in this paper seek knowledge and 
clarity in the forensic sciences, rather than improvement.  Of course, 
improvement is a likely byproduct of scientific study, and there is nothing 
wrong with collecting data that address prescriptive questions about how 
forensic science examiners should conduct themselves in light of the 
practical constraints they face.  But in light of the reality that forensic 
science currently plays and will likely continue to play a pivotal role in our 
criminal justice system, the research priority at this juncture should be on 
providing consumers of forensic science (i.e., courts and juries) with the 
information they need to evaluate this evidence. Perhaps the most useful 
descriptive account for purposes of the legal system would focus on 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of various types of forensic 
evidence—e.g., how often do examiners make errors?  Are certain types of 
errors more frequent than others?  Are there particular contexts in which 
errors are more common?  Such information is largely unavailable, yet it is 
critically important for a judge who deliberates over the admissibility of 
forensic evidence or a factfinder who thinks about how much weight to give 
this evidence once admitted.  However, we cannot expect to understand 
these more complex questions without a basic grasp of how forensic 
examiners do their work.  Surprisingly, there is little formal standardization 
of methods within the forensic communities—even the best of the non-
DNA forensic sciences can be considered as much art as science.43  In the 
three studies described below, we seek to grasp—at a very basic level—the 
methods forensic examiners use in making their determinations. 
Study 1: What do examiners generally look for in making comparisons? 
While many forensic disciplines have guidelines that examiners follow 
when making comparisons between samples, those guidelines rarely have a 
rigorous, detailed structure.  For example, while bite mark examiners 
typically “compar[e] the pattern size, and shapes of the suspect’s teeth with 
 
43  DONALD E. SHELTON, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN COURT: CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 50 (2011) (“[F]ingerprint comparison, without scientific standards of point 
similarity, is perhaps more art than science.”). 
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the unknown bite mark using transparent comparison overlays,”44 there is 
no standardized method for how to make the comparison45 or requirement 
as to what tools should be used to make the comparison.46 Fingerprint 
comparison—perhaps the most established forensic discipline—likewise 
offers little more than a general framework for examiners to follow.  Under 
the ACE-V (Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification) method, 
examiners compare a latent fingerprint (a questioned sample) with a 
reference sample (a known sample) by gathering relevant data from the two 
fingerprints, such as the pattern of ridges or orientation of loops in the 
fingerprints.47  Most descriptions of the method do not provide specific, 
detailed rules for examiners to follow when making comparisons or source 
judgments.48  Should one assess certain features first before moving to 
others?  How detailed should the initial analysis be before making 
comparisons between samples?  How much distinction between the samples 
can there be without eliminating the possibility of a match?  The literature 
 
44  David Sweet et al., Computer-Based Production of Bite Mark Comparison Overlays, 
45 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1050, 1050 (1998). 
45  Giannelli, supra note 8, at 936–37 (“Although the expert’s conclusions are based on 
objective data, the opinion is essentially a subjective one. There is no accepted minimum 
number of points of identity required for a positive identification. The experts who have 
testified in reported bite mark cases have used a low of eight points of comparison to a high 
of fifty-two points. Like fingerprint and firearms identifications . . . , the conclusions are 
based on the examiner’s experience and expertise.”). 
46  See Iain Pretty, Unresolved Issues in Bitemark Analysis, in BITEMARK EVIDENCE 547, 
553–54 (Robert B. J. Dorion, ed., 2005) (“An essential component of the determination of 
the validity of bitemark analysis is that the techniques used in the physical comparison 
between suspect dentition and physical injury have been assessed and found valid. One of 
the fundamental problems with this task is the wide variety of techniques that have been 
described in the literature.  Techniques using confocal, reflex and scanning electron 
microscopes; complex computer systems; typing of oral bacteria; special light sources; 
fingerprint dusting powder; and overlays have all been reported.”). 
47  See, e.g., IGOR PACHECO ET AL., MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T FORENSIC SERVS. 
BUREAU, MIAMI-DADE RESEARCH STUDY FOR THE RELIABILITY OF THE ACE-V PROCESS: 
ACCURACY & PRECISION IN LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS 14–15 (2014). 
48  See, e.g., id. (describing ACE-V at only a high level of generality); Glenn 
Langenburg, A Performance Study of the ACE-V Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the 
Accuracy, Precision, Reproducibility, Repeatability, and Biasability of Conclusions 
Resulting from the ACE-V Process, 59 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 219, 226 (2009) 
(describing flexibility for examiners in determining which comparisons are relevant and how 
to document those comparisons); Philip J. Kellman et al., Forensic Comparison and 
Matching of Fingerprints: Using Quantitative Image Measures for Estimating Error Rates 
Through Understanding and Predicting Difficulty, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2014) (“[T]here is no 
formalized process for any of [the ACE-V] steps. There is no method or metric for 
specification of which features should be used for comparison, nor any general measure for 
what counts as sufficient information to make a decision. Examiners rely on their experience 
and training rather than formal methods or quantified rubrics at each step of the process.”). 
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does not appear to provide uniform guidance to examiners on these, and a 
host of other, important questions. 
We suggest beginning with a series of basic, observational studies. 
Several methods could provide insight.  We recommend that a researcher 
obtain a reasonably random sample of twenty or so examiners and either (1) 
ask them to walk through the specific methods they use when making a 
comparison, or (2) observe them making comparisons49 while “thinking out 
loud” and explaining their specific procedures.50  Both methods could be 
employed together, though there would be some risk that interviewing the 
examiner prior to observing her methods might have some influence on the 
methods themselves.51 Researchers should try to identify as many specific 
aspects of examiners’ procedure as possible, but they might specifically 
focus on: (1) the types and numbers of features that examiners track (e.g., 
ridges and bifurcation minutia in fingerprint analyses, size and mold 
characteristics in shoe print analyses), (2) the order in which examiners 
conduct their analyses, (3) the weight examiners place on various features 
they analyze, and (4) the criteria that examiners use when drawing 
conclusions. We offer no hypotheses, but anticipate that these studies will 
reveal great variability across—and even within—the various forensic 
science subfields.52 
Study 2: How much variability is there in examiner methods? 
Once a baseline of methods in a particular forensic discipline is 
established, a natural follow-up question is, “do those methods differ 
between examiners within a single laboratory, between laboratories within a 
region, or between regions?”  This question is important because, as 
discussed above, many forensic sciences appear to lack standard protocols 
 
49  For the sake of ensuring appropriate power, researchers will want to consider the 
extent and specificity of the questions they plan to ask examiners when deciding how many 
samples each examiner should analyze under observation. 
50  For a classic discussion of the value of think aloud protocols, see K. Anders Ericsson 
& Herbert A. Simon, Verbal Reports as Data, 87 PSYCHOL. REV. 215 (1980). 
51  Alternatively, employing both methods could provide some unique insight into the 
differences, if any, in how examiners think they conduct their analyses and how they actually 
conduct them. 
52  We also recognize that examiners may not be able to explicitly explain certain parts 
of their analyses, as there are likely implicit aspects of processing that are relevant to their 
decision making.  See Kellman et al., supra note 48, at 2 (“It would be a mistake . . .  to infer 
that the processes of pattern comparison and the determinants of difficulty are . . . fully 
available for conscious report or explicit description. As in many other complex tasks in 
which learning has led to generative pattern recognition . . . and accurate classification, much 
of the relevant processing is likely to be at least partly implicit.”). 
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that are broadly followed by practitioners.53  Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that laboratories and regions vary widely in terms of the methods they use 
and the ways that common methods are deployed.54  Reliable data on this 
matter are sorely needed.  If the methods and practices of examiners in a 
common forensic subfield vary, then studies conducted in one region or 
laboratory may not tell us much about what examiners elsewhere are doing.  
At a more basic level, it would be alarming if examiner methods differ 
greatly between laboratories, as this could limit any broad conclusions that 
could be made about quality and validity of the examiners’ conclusions.55  
This research is a natural follow-up to Study 1.  The basic observational 
approach also seems appropriate here, though perhaps over a larger, more 
diverse set of examiners.  Follow-up analysis will likely depend on the 
extent of variability found in examiner methods. 
Study 3: Do the most effective examiners employ unique methods? 
Once we know more about the different methods employed by forensic 
scientists, it is appropriate to try to determine which methods produce the 
“best” outcomes.  One way to accomplish this goal would be to identify the 
 
53  NAS Report, supra note 12, at 6 (“Often there are no standard protocols governing 
forensic practice in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place (e.g., 
SWG standards), they often are vague and not enforced in any meaningful way.”). 
54  Scott Bader, Peak Height: DNA, in WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 
2007, 2008 (2009) (In the DNA context, “[t]here is some debate about the threshold value 
above which a peak can be declared as a ‘real’ peak that represents a piece of DNA, as 
opposed to chance occurrence of noise of sufficient intensity to appear as a peak. Different 
laboratories use different thresholds, decisions that may be based on objective principle, 
scientific validation, or rule-of-thumb experience.”); NAT’L INSTIT. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A 
SYSTEMS APPROACH 7 (2012) (In the fingerprint context, “[t]he thresholds for these decisions 
can vary among examiners and among forensic service providers. Some examiners state that 
they report identification if they find a particular number of relatively rare concurring 
features, for instance, eight or twelve. Others do not use any fixed numerical standard. Some 
examiners discount seemingly different details as long as there are enough similarities 
between the two prints. Other examiners practice the one-dissimilarity rule, excluding a print 
if a single dissimilarity not attributable to perceptible distortion exists. If the examiner 
decides that the degree of similarity falls short of satisfying the standard, the examiner can 
report an inconclusive outcome. If the conclusion is that the degree of similarity satisfies the 
standard, the examiner reports an identification.”); NAS Report, supra note 12, at 139 (In the 
fingerprint context, “[i]n the United States, the threshold for making a source identification 
is deliberately kept subjective, so that the examiner can take into account both the quantity 
and quality of comparable details. As a result, the outcome of a friction ridge analysis is not 
necessarily repeatable from examiner to examiner.”). 
55  NAS Report, supra note 12, at 16 (“The fragmented nature of the enterprise raises the 
worrisome prospect that the quality of evidence presented in court, and its interpretation, can 
vary unpredictably according to jurisdiction.”). 
1. KOEHLER-MEIXNER 12/18/2016  5:57 PM 
14 KOEHLER & MEIXNER [Vol. 106 
most successful examiners, and then study the ways in which their methods 
differ from those of other examiners.  Unfortunately, this is easier said than 
done. Forensic examiners do not come with “batting averages,” and it is 
rarely possible to truly know whether an examiner did or did not make the 
correct call in a case due to the lack of ground truth.  Therefore, the first 
step in this process would be to identify one or more ways to spot the most 
effective examiners.56 
One possible method could involve proficiency tests in which ground 
truth is available.  The methods used by top scorers on a proficiency test 
that includes challenging, realistic samples could be compared to those used 
by others.  A second, less direct approach would be to develop and rely on a 
reputation index within the forensic community.  The forensic science 
community could be polled, in essence, to determine who among them is 
believed to be part of the most skilled or accurate subgroup.  Once this elite 
subgroup is identified, the observation would proceed as in Studies 1 and 2, 
with a focus on identifying differences in method between more skilled and 
less skilled examiners.  Obviously, the second method is simpler to 
administer than the first.  But the first method would likely yield more 
reliable results and has other ancillary benefits, such as providing evidence 
about which types of samples are more or less likely to be analyzed 
correctly by forensic scientists of varying ability levels. 
DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES: EFFECTS OF DIFFERENCES IN SAMPLE AND 
METHODOLOGY ON ACCURACY 
Beyond the baseline studies described above that identify what 
examiners are doing, the most legally relevant questions regarding forensic 
science involve how well examiners are doing.  These questions cut straight 
to the heart of the Daubert Court’s emphasis on the validity57 of an expert’s 
methods and the likelihood that those methods will produce accurate data 
for the trier of fact. Although the courts have largely given a pass to the 
forensic sciences on matters pertaining to error rate,58 fingerprint scholars 
have conducted some research on error rates.59  Although these error rate 
 
56  See, e.g., Jason M. Tangen et al., Identifying Fingerprint Expertise, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
995 (2011); Matthew B. Thompson et al., Expertise in Fingerprint Identification, 58 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 1519 (2013); Kellman et al., supra note 48, at 3, 10–11. 
57  See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993); supra note 23. 
58  Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 790 (2011). 
59  See, e.g., Thomas A. Busey & John R. Vanderkolk, Behavioral and 
Electrophysiological Evidence for Configural Processing in Fingerprint Experts, 45 VISION 
RES. 431, 436 (2005); Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent 
Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 7733, 7737 (2011); PACHECO ET 
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studies are seriously flawed,60 the fact that such tests were undertaken in 
one forensic science domain suggests movement in the direction of science 
and data, and away from the unsupported opinions and beliefs of forensic 
scientists.61  While we support a comprehensive program of blind 
proficiency testing for the forensic sciences, administered by disinterested 
parties using realistic samples,62 we propose five additional studies below 
(Studies 4–8) that examine the effects of sample difficulty on errors, the 
distribution of errors, and the value of particular types of examination. 
Study 4: Does the difficulty of the sample affect accuracy? 
Generally, a forensic examiner makes comparisons between one or 
more questioned samples (often recovered from a crime scene) and one or 
more known samples.  Questioned samples are highly variable in quality.  
A shoe may only have marked a portion of a surface, a bite may not have 
been complete, or a fingerprint may have smeared.  One implication of this 
variability is that some comparisons an examiner is asked to make are more 
difficult than others.  Relatedly, some forensic sources may leave markings 
that are not particularly distinctive, and this may also make it more difficult 
for examiners to narrow the set of potential donors of a questioned sample.  
Other factors may influence difficulty as well.  Whether this variation 
affects the accuracy of an examiner’s conclusions is a relevant question for 
a judge or factfinder because the difficulty of a decision could affect the 
weight a decision maker gives to the decision.  In the fingerprint domain, 
some studies have already examined this question with somewhat mixed 
results.63  We propose similar research in other disciplines. 
 
AL., supra note 47, at 2; Kellman et al., supra note 48; Tangen et al., supra note 56. 
60  Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Testing for Accuracy in the Forensic 
Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J.. (forthcoming January 2018) (on file with author), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773255 (criticizing recent fingerprint error rate studies for using 
volunteer participants, a non-blind test format, and for being conducted by researchers who 
may have a career stake in demonstrating very low rates of error).  
61  One important reason rigorous testing is needed across the forensic sciences is that 
many people are naively optimistic about the risk of forensic science error.  See Jonathan 
Koehler, Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic Sciences, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 7 
(forthcoming Winter 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817443 (providing evidence from an 
online study that shows mock jurors estimate the false positive error rate for various forensic 
sciences to be on the order of 1 in 1,000,000). 
62  Jonathan J. Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate Error Rates in the Forensic  
Sciences, 12 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 89, 93–94 (2013). 
63  Compare Kellman et al., supra note 48, at 7 (finding correlation between average 
accuracy and self-reported difficulty of comparison) and Matthew B. Thompson et al., 
Humans Matching Fingerprints: Sequence and Size, 54 PROC. OF THE HUM. FACTORS & 
ERGONOMICS SOC’Y ANN. MEETING 478, 480–81 (2010) (amount of visible area in a target 
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Following Kellman’s work, a study could begin by generating a set of 
questioned samples of varying difficulties.  Kellman generated a varied set 
of questioned fingerprint samples by instructing participants to touch 
surfaces in different ways.64  Those samples were then recovered and 
evaluated for difficulty, but only by the examiner-participants who were 
being tested.65  Alternatively, the samples could be graded for difficulty in 
advance by independent “graders,” and investigators could then provide 
examiners with samples that vary in terms of difficulty level.66  If difficulty 
served as a within-subjects independent variable, researchers might be able 
to determine the point at which difficulty begins to affect examiner 
accuracy and by how much. 
Study 5: Applying signal detection theory: Can examiners’ decision 
thresholds be shifted? 
Many forensic domains center around binary classifications in which 
an examiner decides whether a questioned and known sample share a 
common source.  Holding aside “inconclusives,” each match / no match 
decision falls into one of four categories: (1) true positive (i.e., a correct 
match decision), (2) true negative (a correct nonmatch decision), (3) false 
positive (an incorrect match decision), or (4) false negative (an incorrect 
nonmatch decision).  Two measures are commonly used to describe 
performance in such a task: (1) d prime (the extent to which an observer 
correctly identifies a distinctive stimulus), and (2) Beta (the threshold for 
making a decision as to whether the stimulus is present).67  Even if two 
examiners have the same discriminability to detect matches and 
nonmatches, one examiner might have a strict criterion before calling a 
match, whereas a second examiner might have a modest criterion. The beta 
value for the individual examiner represents this threshold.  The beta value 
is particularly important in forensic decision making for at least two 
reasons: (1) in legal contexts where a normative decision has been made to 
 
print is positively correlated with classification accuracy), with PACHECO ET AL., supra note 
47, at 57 (finding effects of difficulty on the number of inconclusive determinations made by 
examiners, but no effects on accuracy when a determination is made).  
64  Kellman et al., supra note 48, at 6. 
65  Id. at 10. 
66  See generally Drew P. Pulsifer et al., An Objective Fingerprint Quality-Grading 
System, 231 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 204 (2013) (attempting to provide an objective system or 
grading of difficulty). 
67  David A. Balota & Elizabeth J. March, Cognitive Psychology: An Overview, in 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: KEY READINGS 1, 3–4 (David A. Balota & Elizabeth J. March 
eds., 2004); Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV., 625, 628–30 (2002). 
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place a heavy burden on one party (e.g., the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard for a criminal conviction), we may want to ensure that a similarly 
high threshold is used in assessing potentially very powerful evidence that 
could negate that burden; and (2) we want to ensure consistency in 
examiners such that there are not some who trend toward a high true 
positive rate at the risk of a high false positive rate or a high true negative 
rate at the risk of a high false negative rate. 
We suggest a study with two goals in mind: (1) determining whether 
and when there is variability among examiners in their beta thresholds,68 
and (2) determining whether those thresholds can be modified to push 
examiners toward consistency (or toward a threshold that is set from a 
policy perspective).  Much like Study 4, the simplest study would involve 
presenting forensic examiners with a set of samples and asking them to 
make match / no match decisions.  In order to have sufficient statistical 
power to identify significant but small differences in beta thresholds, we 
recommend a larger sample of both examiners and forensic stimuli in this 
study than in others.  For each examiner, the set of stimuli must be 
extensive enough to generate outcomes in each of the four categories 
described above.  After gathering data, a researcher could determine the 
extent of differences in beta thresholds among examiners.  If there are 
differences, a follow-up study could attempt to push outlier examiners 
toward a more moderate threshold by either (1) instructing them to change 
their thresholds, or (2) providing trial by trial outcome feedback to outlier 
examiners about the conclusions reached by other examiners who have 
more desirable beta values. 
Study 6: Does examiner confidence correlate with accuracy? 
A question related to whether forensic comparison difficulty affects 
accuracy is whether examiners’ confidence in their conclusions correlates 
with their accuracy.  Substantial research in psychology indicates a weak or 
even nonexistent relationship between accuracy and confidence in a variety 
of tasks (including eyewitness testimony).69  However, some research in the 
fingerprint domain has found the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy to be at least as high as that between difficulty and accuracy.70  
This link is important in forensic science for several reasons.  First, if 
 
68  See Ulery et al., supra note 59, at 7737 (making some progress on this front, though it 
did not include extensive discussion of the nature of examiner variability in beta threshold). 
69  See, e.g., Sigfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A 
Meta-analysis of the Confidence-accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 315 (1995). 
70  Kellman et al., supra note 48, at 7. 
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examiner confidence is a reliable indicator of accuracy, examiners may be 
able to assist judges and factfinders by providing confidence estimates for 
their conclusions about the similarity between samples.  Second, because 
jurors rely, in part, on experts’ confidence when assessing the credibility of 
their testimony,71 it would be helpful for jurors to have a more objective 
indicator of experts’ confidence rather than try to infer it from body 
language or other peripheral cues. 
We propose a study that uses methods similar to those proposed in  
Study 4 (which examines the difficulty-accuracy relationship) to examine 
the confidence-accuracy relationship.  Confidence ratings could be made on 
a multipoint Likert-type scale,72 and the relationship with accuracy should 
be measured separately for match / no match conclusions, as discussed 
above with regard to signal detection theory.  In domains where pilot testing 
indicates that agreement among examiners is likely to be high, the study 
will need to include a relatively larger number of stimuli or examiners.  By 
way of a sports analogy, if we wish to test whether some outside influence 
(e.g., noise) affects the ability of professional basketball players to make 
layups or some similarly easy shot, we would need to test many players 
shooting many layups to obtain a sufficient quantity of missed layups in the 
analysis. 
Study 7: Does the use of a computer database affect match report 
accuracy? 
Over the past several decades, some forensic disciplines have begun to 
develop databases of known forensic samples for future comparison with 
questioned samples. The most well-known database is the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), a database that includes millions 
of fingerprints.73 As the forensic subfields continue to develop databases 
 
71  Robert J. Cramer et al., Expert Witness Confidence and Juror Personality: Their 
Impact on Credibility and Persuasion in the Courtroom, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 63, 
68–69 (2009). 
72  A Likert-type scale is a response scale that is commonly used on surveys and 
questionnaires.  A typical scale item provides study participants with a statement (e.g., “I 
like chocolate ice cream”) and asks participants to indicate their degree of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement using a numbered scale, which often ranges from one 
(strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree).  The goal is to allow the researcher to measure 
the intensity of a participant’s feelings about a particular matter.  For further detail, see 
Michael S. Matell & Jacob Jacoby, Is There an Optimal Number of Alternatives for Likert 
Scale Items?, 31 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 657 (1971). 
73  See NAT’L INST. OF JUST., FINGERPRINTS: AN OVERVIEW n.1 (July 1, 2016),  
http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/impression/pages/fingerprints.aspx#note1 
(showing that other forensic disciplines maintain databases as well). 
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that store prints and markings, a question arises as to whether the risk of 
examiner error increases as the databases become larger. As others have 
observed, searches through such a large database may uncover prints from 
different fingers that nonetheless appear similar to the questioned (latent) 
sample: 
Ironically, the practical importance of understanding when and why fingerprint 
comparison errors occur is likely to increase as technology advances. It is common for 
a latent print to be submitted to an AFIS . . . database, where automated routines 
return a number of most likely potential matches. Error rates (especially of the false-
positive type) may increase as databases get larger (currently some databases include 
tens of millions of prints). The reason for this is that as a database grows, an AFIS 
searching that database is increasingly likely to find close non-matches.74 
The notions that use of a database entails special error considerations,75 
and that the risk of error may increase as the size of the database increases, 
are empirical questions.76 
One method for studying this issue could be similar to that of Study 4, 
replacing the sample difficulty independent variable in that study with a use 
of computerized database (i.e., yes, no) independent variable.  In the 
fingerprint context, the stimulus set could include an even split of (1) 
known samples selected from AFIS based on similarity to a corresponding 
questioned print, and (2) known samples that are similar to both one another 
and the corresponding questioned print, but which are not selected from any 
database.  If results indicate that the use of a database does affect accuracy 
at the individual-examiner level, a follow-up study could examine the effect 
of the size of the database.  For example, the stimulus set could include an 
even split of (1) known samples selected from the entire AFIS database 
based on similarity to a corresponding questioned print, and (2) known 
samples selected from only half (or some other subset) of AFIS.  One might 
expect that for larger databases, the similarity of the selected known 
samples to the questioned sample would also increase, thereby increasing 
 
74  Kellman et al., supra note 48, at 2; see also Itiel E. Dror & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The 
Use of Technology in Human Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of 
Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems in Forensic Science, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & 
RISK 47, 57 (2010). 
75  See Itiel E. Dror et al., The Impact of Human-technology, Cooperation and 
Distributed Cognition in Forensic Science: Biasing Effects of AFIS Contextual Information 
on Human Experts, 57 J. FORENSIC SCI. 343, 343–44 (2012) (showing there is evidence that 
the judgments of fingerprint examiners who use databases are affected by the position of the 
matching print in the AFIS list). 
76  See generally id. at 343 (recently examining other potential issues with AFIS, notably 
the biasing impact of the order in which AFIS returns potential matches, but did not examine 
the variables suggested here). 
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the chance of false positive errors.77 
The policy implications of this study may be difficult to navigate. 
Even if the use of large databases increases the risk of false positive error in 
some domains (because the database has returned close non-matches), it 
may decrease the risk of false negative errors (because in a large database, 
the best match is more likely to be a true match due to the greater 
inclusiveness of the database).  If true, then policy makers will need to 
assess whether the decreased risk of one type of error associated with large 
databases provides adequate compensation for the increased risk of the 
other type of error. 
Study 8: How many points of similarity should examiners use? 
Comparison between known and questioned forensic samples typically 
involves examination of noteworthy class and individuating features in the 
samples.78  However, none of the traditional forensic sciences provide clear 
guidance to examiners about the number of matching features that must be 
examined prior to reaching a conclusion about who or what made the print 
or marking in question.79  One might assume that increasing the signal by 
increasing the number of minutia points observed would decrease the risk 
of false positive errors, but it would likely also increase the risk of false 
negative errors.  Further, there may be a point where increases in the 
number of signals provide little or no gain.  Ultimately, these are empirical 
questions. 
We propose a study in which the number of points of similarity used in 
a questioned sample analysis is manipulated as a within-subjects 
independent variable.  The methods would largely mirror those of Study 4.  
Forensic examiners would be assigned a number of sample pairs and would 
make match / no match decisions on each.  However, the number of points 
of similarity to be used—which an examiner would typically determine on a 
case-by-case basis—would be assigned randomly on each trial.  This 
variable could then be examined for effects, if any, on error rates (both false 
 
77  Computer searches generally provide a rank-ordered set of candidate matches from 
the database (e.g., the closest twenty prints).  The examiner then makes a series of pairwise 
comparisons between the questioned print and the known prints until the examiner is 
satisfied that there is or is not a match.  We are suggesting that with more prints in the 
database, the non-matching candidates that the computer search generates may be more 
similar to the questioned print than the non-matching prints that would be generated if the 
database were smaller.  This increased similarity between the questioned print and the non-
matching computer generated prints may increase the risk of a false positive error.  
78  See supra notes 44–48.  
79  NAS Report, supra note 12, at 141. 
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positive and false negatives).80 
DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES: EFFECTS OF BIASING INFORMATION AND 
METHODS ON ACCURACY 
Since the early 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of the role 
cognitive bias may play in forensic science.81  Much of the relevant research 
has focused on whether and how examiners may be influenced by 
information that is unrelated to the actual process of making a scientific 
assessment.82  Some forensic scientists appear to be influenced by 
extraneous information, particularly when the information is itself highly 
probative of a material issue.  For example, when fingerprint examiners are 
aware that a suspect has confessed or that other examiners have reported a 
match, they appear to be more likely to report a match.83  But what about 
 
80  See Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint 
Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 524 (2007) 
(examining questions along these lines in the fingerprint domain; this study found evidence 
for increased discriminability up to twelve points of similarity, though there were decreasing 
returns when approaching that number); see also NAS Report, supra note 12, at 61–63. 
81  See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1 (2002); see also William C. Thompson, Interpretation: Observer Effects, in WILEY 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 1575 (2009). 
82  See generally Gary Edmond et al., Contextual Bias and Cross-Contamination in the 
Forensic Sciences: The Corrosive Implications for Investigations, Plea Bargains, Trials and 
Appeals Examination Casework, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 1 (2015) (explaining “that 
lawyers and courts have not recognized how contextual bias and cognitive processes may 
distort and undermine the probative value of expert evidence”); Bryan Found & John Ganas, 
The Management of Domain Irrelevant Context Information in Forensic Handwriting 
Examination Casework, 53 SCI. & JUST. 154 (2013) (describing a procedure to reduce the 
risk that potentially biasing, domain irrelevant information, reaches a handwriting examiner); 
Sherry Nakhaeizadeh et al., The Power Of Contextual Effects In Forensic Anthropology: A 
Study of Biasability In The Visual Interpretations of Trauma Analysis on Skeletal Remains, 
59 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1177 (2014); Nikola K. P. Osborne et al., Does Contextual Information 
Bias Bitemark Comparisons?, 54 SCI. & JUST. 267, 272 (2014) (reporting the results of a 
study showing that “bitemark comparisons – whether they are made by people with or 
without dental experience – are susceptible to contextual influences”); Mark Page et al., 
Context Effects And Observer Bias: Implications for Forensic Odontology, 57 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 108 (2012). 
83  See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to 
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74 (2006); Saul M. Kassin et al., 
The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. 
APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42, 50 (2013) (“judges and juries need to know that 
forensic science conclusions that appear to corroborate a confession or eyewitness 
identification may, in fact, have been influenced by these previously collected forms of 
evidence”); Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects During 
the Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology When Conducting Fingerprint 
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subtler forms of contextual bias that provide less probative information?  
Do the questions that examiners are asked to answer, or the order in which 
they’re asked to answer those questions affect forensic judgment?  We 
suggest four additional studies (Studies 9–12) below related to this issue. 
Study 9: Does biasing information interact with the questions examiners 
are asked to answer? 
Psychologists have long known that the way questions are asked can 
exert large effects on the answers that people provide in legal and non-legal 
contexts.84  Less clear is whether the way questions are asked of trained 
professional forensic examiners affect the conclusions that they reach. 
Sometimes forensic examiners are asked by investigators or attorneys to 
identify the source of evidentiary material.  Whose DNA is it?  Which 
carpet did that fiber come from?  Other times forensic examiners are asked 
whether the DNA could have come from the suspect, or whether that carpet 
fiber is consistent with the carpet in the victim’s car.  And still other times 
forensic examiners simply identify similarities or dissimilarities between 
two forensic samples without offering conclusions or opinions about 
whether the items could or did come from a common source.  In this study, 
we seek to examine the interaction between these various question types 
and the presence or absence of contextually biasing information.  In other 
words, are any of these questions more or less likely to lead to an erroneous 
response when combined with extraneous contextual information? 
When an examiner is asked to identify the source of a questioned 
sample, it is arguably reasonable for the examiner to take into account any 
and all information he or she may know about the case.  Indeed, from a 
Bayesian standpoint,85 both forensic and non-forensic information are 
 
Comparisons, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 571 (2009). 
84  See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 96 (1979) (describing, among 
other things, an experiment that showed that people judged the speed of cars that were 
involved in a videotaped accident differently depending on whether the cars were said to 
have smashed, collided, bumped or contacted). 
85  DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, § 14.3.1 pp. 639–42 
(2d ed. 2011) (Bayes’ Theorem is a mathematical tool that tells decision makers how they 
should update their probabilistic beliefs about a hypothesis in the face of new evidence.  
Suppose a decision maker wanted to assess the probability that a suspect is the source of a 
questioned fingerprint in light of evidence from a forensic examiner that the suspect’s print 
matches the questioned print.  In this situation, Bayes counsels the decision maker to (1) 
identify a prior probability that the suspect is the source of the print (i.e., prior to the 
introduction of the evidence of the forensic match), (2) identify the strength of the evidence 
associated with the reported match, and (3) combine the prior probability with the evidence 
strength to form a “posterior probability” that the suspect is the source of the questioned 
print.).  
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required to answer the question.86  However, if the question is restricted to 
identifying similarities or dissimilarities between the questioned and known 
samples, non-forensic case information is less relevant and potentially 
biasing.  A simple version of such a restricted question might be, “how 
similar are the two fingerprints to one another?” More formally, examiners 
might be asked to estimate a likelihood ratio that corresponds to the 
evidentiary strength of their observations (provided that sufficient data for 
such estimates exist).  If this were done, then the trier of fact could combine 
the forensic evidence with the non-forensic case evidence to form 
judgments about the source and guilt likelihoods for themselves.  In this 
manner, forensic judgments would retain their independence and avoid 
being double counted.87  We suggest a basic experiment to test whether the 
specific questions posed to examiners interacts with potentially biasing 
contextual information on the answers they provide. 
We recommend a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, crossing question 
type (item similarity vs. source) and biasing information (present vs. 
absent).88  A sample of forensic examiners would be asked to make 
comparisons between pairs of forensic samples.  Half of the examiners 
would be asked a source question (e.g., “was the questioned sample derived 
from the same source as the known sample?”), and half would be asked a 
more restricted question that does not invite the use of contextually biasing 
information (e.g., “on a scale of 1–7, how similar are the two samples?”).  
Completing the full cross, half of the examiners would be presented with 
biasing information, while half would complete the comparisons without 
 
86  Id.; see also Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing 
Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence Methods, 75 CORNELL 
L. REV. 247, 255–56 (1990) (providing a detailed account of how Bayes theorem may be 
used to combine different items of evidence in a legal context). 
87  But see Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of 
Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47–48 (1993) (arguing 
that double counting may actually be normatively appropriate within the Bayesian 
framework). 
88  A 2 x 2 between-subjects design is one in which there are two manipulated 
independent variables (in this case, question type and biasing information) and two levels of 
each of those independent variables (e.g., the feature is absent or present).  In this manner, 
each study participant would receive exactly one of four possible stimuli.  To put this 
experimental design in a more intuitive context, an experimenter interested in studying the 
impact of the color (red and green) and size (small or large) of a tip jar on people’s 
willingness to tip in coffee shops might assign customers to view either a small red jar, a 
small green jar, a large red jar, or a large green jar.  If there were 100 people in the study, it 
would be common for each person to be assigned, at random, to view one of the four tip jars 
such that, in the end, about twenty-five people viewed each of the four jars. 
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biasing information.89 
Study 10: Does the presence of multiple samples or the order in which 
samples are examined bias conclusions? 
Examiners likely use a broad range of sample-present and sample-
absent features when comparing questioned and known samples.  Reliance 
on a broad set of features could, however, introduce potential biases.  For 
example, examiners’ awareness of specific features in questioned or known 
samples could affect the way they allocate their subsequent attention, their 
visual searches, and even their thresholds for determining a match.90  Here, 
we focus on two particular potential effects: (1) effects of the mere 
availability of a known sample that is available to be directly and repeatedly 
compared with a questioned sample, and (2) the order in which the two 
samples are examined.91 
We suggest a between-subjects experiment with four groups.  Each 
group would contain an equal number of forensic examiners who would 
conduct analyses on a set of questioned samples.  The first group of 
examiners would begin by examining a questioned sample for information.  
Once completed, these examiners would examine a known sample, and then 
draw conclusions.  The second group would initially examine only the 
known sample for information, before examining the questioned sample 
and drawing conclusions.  A third group would rely on the examination 
 
89  One might also consider varying the type of biasing information presented: for 
example, experimenters might indicate to the examiner the race or gender of the suspect, or 
tell the examiner that incriminating evidence was found in the suspect’s possession. 
90  See Itiel E. Dror et al., Cognitive Issues in Fingerprint Analysis: Inter- and Intra-
Expert Consistency and the Effect of a “Target” Comparison, 208 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 10 
(2011); see also Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision In “Blind” Justice: Expert 
Perception, Judgment, and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition, 17 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 161, 162 (2010). 
91  See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification: Bayesian Information Gain, 
Base-Rate Effect-Equivalency Curves, and Reasonable Suspicion, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
99, 99–100 (2015) (extensively documenting the ways in which the structure of a lineup can 
affect decision outcomes; relatedly, while forensic comparisons are typically pairwise 
(between a single known sample and a single questioned sample), such an approach may 
introduce bias if the examiner, for whatever reason, has an a priori belief that the suspect is 
guilty or is likely to be the source of the unknown); see also Larry S. Miller, Procedural 
Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987) 
(hinting that the lineup approach could reduce examiner errors, though the sample size in 
that study is small and the participant population was relatively inexperienced). Study 10 (or 
a follow-up study) could be expanded to examine the effects of the inclusion of multiple 
known samples to compare with a single questioned sample, much the way an eyewitness 
seeks to compare a single mental image of an unknown individual viewed at a crime scene 
with multiple knowns in the context of a suspect lineup at the police station. 
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results of the first group for the questioned sample features, and the results 
of the second group for the known sample features.  A fourth group would 
have access to both samples for the duration of each examination.  Various 
dependent variables could be examined including the rates of accuracy and 
inconclusives in each group. 
Study 11: Are examiners affected by knowledge of a forthcoming review? 
Most forensic disciplines do not routinely include a “verifier” to check 
the work of an examiner.  Although verification imposes extra costs, it 
would seem to be an important part of a purportedly scientific enterprise.  
Fingerprint analysis appears to be the only discipline that routinely employs 
a verifier.92  Though there is some evidence that verification is an effective 
method for catching false positive errors,93 examiners may behave 
differently and reach different conclusions if they know or suspect that a 
review of their work is forthcoming.  Potential effects could be either 
positive or negative. On the one hand, examiners’ overall accuracy rates 
might increase if they are motivated to be more thorough and careful when 
assessing the information in the samples, knowing the potential for reversal.  
On the other hand, examiners might exhibit a sort of social loafing,94 
knowing that another examiner will be there to correct any errors.  Forensic 
researcher Glenn Langenburg has noted a similar problem related to 
verification that he refers to as a “bias loop,” in which examiners who know 
that their work will be checked are affected by that knowledge, as are the 
verifiers who know that they are merely verifying the work of another 
examiner who has presumably studied the matter carefully.95  Further, 
knowledge of a forthcoming review might not affect false positive and false 
negative rates equally.  If examiners believe that there is greater 
professional or societal harm associated with committing a false positive 
error relative to a false negative error (for example, because of the potential 
harm to an innocent victim; a result that the justice system is designed to 
 
92  See, e.g., Langenburg, supra note 48, at 219–20 (stating that verification is the norm 
in fingerprint analysis: The “V” in the ACE-V fingerprint procedure stands for 
“verification”); PACHECO ET AL., supra note 47, at 7–8; see also NAS Report, supra note 12, 
at 64 (finding through an internal survey, 69% of fingerprint units reported having some 
system for verifying results).  
93  See, e.g., PACHECO ET AL., supra note 47, at 20; Ulery et al., supra note 59, at 7737–
38. 
94  See, e.g., Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, Social Loafing: A Meta-Analytic 
Review and Theoretical Integration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681, 681 (1993) 
(describing social loafing as “the reduction in motivation and effort when individuals work 
collectively compared with when they work individually or coactively”). 
95  Langenburg, supra note 48, at 242. 
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avoid), they might alter their usual thresholds for making match decisions, 
lowering their false positive error rate but increasing their false negative 
error rate. 
Last, knowledge of forthcoming review might interact with the 
presence of contextually biasing information: examiners might be more 
aware of potential bias when a second examiner, who may have no 
knowledge of the biasing information, will be checking their work.96 
We recommend a 2 x 2 between-subjects design similar to the one 
proposed in Study 9, crossing knowledge of a forthcoming review (present 
vs. absent) and biasing information (present vs. absent).  A sample of 
forensic examiners would be asked to compare a set of forensic sample 
pairs.  Half of the examiners would be told that a second examiner will 
review their work and make a separate determination, while half would be 
told that they are the only examiners reviewing each sample.  Completing 
the full cross, half of the examiners would be presented with biasing 
information as described in Study 9. 
Study 12: Can examiners be debiased? 
As research demonstrating the pernicious effects of contextually 
biasing information on forensic examiners continues to appear, attention 
has begun to shift toward ways to reduce these biases.97  The psychological 
literature suggests that even where the introduction of contextually biasing 
information cannot be avoided, there may be ways to mitigate the biasing 
effect on the forensic examiner herself.  For example, providing examiners 
with a general education on the way bias can influence judgments might be 
useful and has been suggested as an important tool.98  Relatedly, research in 
a number of domains suggests that requiring decision makers to consider 
various alternative hypotheses and explanations might also be a useful way 
to reduce overconfidence and debias judgment.99  Importing this idea into 
 
96  See Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 255, 256 
(2005) (proposing model in which forensic examiners compete with each other to improve 
performance); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 
46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285 (1983). 
97  See Itiel E. Dror, Practical Solutions to Cognitive and Human Factor Challenges in 
Forensic Science, 4 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 1, 5–6 (2013); Kassin et al., supra note 
83, at 49–50; Elizabeth J. Reese, Techniques for Mitigating Cognitive Biases in Fingerprint 
Identification, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1252, 1280–88 (2012); Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential 
Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 1006 (2008).  
98  Dror, supra note 97, at 5. 
99  See, e.g., Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider-
an-Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1069 
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the forensic arena, it may be that requiring examiners to consider specific 
alternative explanations to their beliefs about whether a pair of samples 
does or does not share a common source will lead to less biased judgments.  
We suggest a study to measure the effects of these two debiasing strategies. 
This study could simply compare five groups of examiners who are 
asked to make match / no match decisions on a set of questioned forensic 
samples in a given domain in the presence of contextually biasing 
information.  Group 1 would not be exposed to any sort of debiasing 
procedure.  Group 2 would receive generalized training on the dangers of 
cognitive bias in decision making prior to evaluating the sample pairs.   
Group 3 would be required to explain what her hypothesis is (both at a 
broad match / no match level and at a narrower minutiae-point level) and 
identify potential alternative explanations for each sample pair.  Group 4 
would go through both debiasing procedures (education plus identify 
alternative explanations).  Group 5, a control group, would not be exposed 
to contextually biasing information and would not go through any debiasing 
procedure. 
DESCRIPTIVE STUDIES: HOW EXAMINERS REPORT THEIR RESULTS 
AND HOW JUDICIAL ACTORS INTERPRET THEM 
Our discussion so far has focused on the examiners’ methods in 
collecting data and drawing conclusions regarding forensic samples—what 
could be called the input process for generating forensic data. In order for 
those data to impact the legal process, they must be output to a third party, 
such as a judge acting as an evidentiary gatekeeper or a jury acting as a 
factfinder.  Thus, the current problems with forensic science cannot be 
solved simply by addressing issues with inputs on the front end (e.g., taking 
steps to increase consistency or reduce bias).  Instead, we must also 
consider what can be done on the back end to ensure that judges, jurors and 
others give forensic science its proper weight.  Empirical questions arise as 
to how this back end output process does and should occur.  We propose 
two preliminary studies (Studies 13 and 14) below. 
 
(1995); Lutz Kaufmann et al., Debiasing the Supplier Selection Decision: A Taxonomy and 
Conceptualization, 40 INT’L J. PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 792 (2010); 
Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 499, 500  (1991); Charles Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: 
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY& 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective 
Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1233 (1984).  But 
see Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical Judgment and Possible Ways to 
Minimize Their Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323, 326 (1981) (arguing 
against the use of generalized education regarding bias as a debiasing method). 
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Study 13: How do forensic examiners actually testify in court? 
Forensic scientists have been criticized for exaggerating the strength of 
the evidence they report.100  For example, forensic scientists have often 
testified that a person or an object is the source of an evidentiary item “to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” or words to that effect.101  But as 
a draft report from the National Commission on Forensic Science recently 
pointed out, this common phrase has “no scientific meaning and may 
mislead factfinders about the level of objectivity involved in the analysis, 
its scientific reliability and limitations, and the ability of the analysis to 
reach a conclusion.”102  This rebuke raises the question of how often such 
misleading terminology is actually used and, more generally, what types of 
language examiners use to convey their findings.  To our knowledge, the 
issue has not been studied in any systematic way. How often do examiners 
make source statements?  How do they phrase those source statements?  
How do they explain their level of certainty or the possibility of an error?  
How do they explain potential inconclusive decisions?  How much 
variability is there on this matter across jurisdictions, laboratories, and 
individual examiners working in the same laboratory?  A systematic 
examination of these questions would provide a helpful starting point for 
any type of reform in this area. 
We suggest beginning with an archival study of a random sample of 
trial transcripts that seeks to classify the various types of testimony 
provided by forensic scientists.  One classification could be as simple as 
whether the testimony did or did not include exaggerated, misleading, or 
false scientific claims.  Other classifications could consider whether the 
testimony made direct claims about the source of a sample (as opposed to 
claims about the similarity between samples), or whether the testimony 
included “weighting guides” for the factfinder regarding the examiner’s 
confidence or the strength of similarity between samples.  Such transcripts 
will not be easy to obtain, as they are typically proprietary and not readily 
 
100  See, e.g., Alex Biedermann et al., The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability and 
the Problem of Individualisation in Forensic Science, 53 SCI. & JUST. 192 (2013); Christophe 
Champod, Fingerprint Examination: Towards More Transparency, 7 LAW PROBABILITY & 
RISK 111 (2008); Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA 
Evidence, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 22 (1993); C. Neumann et al., Quantifying the Weight of 
Evidence from a Forensic Fingerprint Comparison: A New Paradigm, 175 J. ROYAL STAT. 
SOC’Y 371 (2012); Mark Page et al., Uniqueness in the Forensic Identification Sciences—
Fact or Fiction?, 206 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 12 (2011); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, 
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 200 
(2008). 
101  NAT'L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 54, at 118–20. 
102  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 31. 
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available from online databases.103  Even if a non-random sample of 
transcripts could be cobbled together, it would still be useful to review the 
language used by testifying forensic scientists under direct and cross 
examination as a way to generate testable research hypotheses about expert 
testimony. 
Study 14: How should examiners present evidence in court? 
After learning more about how forensic scientists in the various 
domains present their evidence in court, we should turn our attention to the 
back-end process of how consumers of forensic science evidence respond to 
that evidence.  Over the past thirty years, psychologists have conducted 
many controlled experiments that examine how people process forensic 
science evidence.104  Much of this research suggests that people may not 
weigh forensic science evidence appropriately,105 or that they may be 
influenced by the way in which the forensic science statistics are 
presented.106  At this point, the field should focus on developing 
 
103  In light of the importance of trial transcripts for examining all aspects of expert 
testimony at trial, we hope that some researchers or agency will take steps to create a 
database of forensic trial transcripts.  
104  David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic 
Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 75 (1991) (an early review of the probabilistic 
studies); Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: 
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996); Jonathan 
J. Koehler, If the Shoe Fits, They Might Acquit: The Value of Forensic Science Testimony, 8 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 21 (2011); Samuel Lindsey et al., Communicating Statistical 
DNA Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (2003). 
105  Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An 
Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small 
Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 418–36 (2005) (reporting that people 
undervalue DNA match testimony); Jason Schklar & Shari Diamond, Juror Reactions to 
DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 176 (1999) 
(reporting that DNA study participants “misaggregated the probabilistic evidence with their 
prior probability of guilt estimates”); Nicholas Scurich, The Differential Effect of Numeracy 
and Anecdotes on the Perceived Fallibility of Forensic Science, 22 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & 
L. 616, 616 (2015) (reporting that “innumerate” participants based their valuations of DNA 
evidence on anecdotal information rather than scientifically derived error rate information); 
William C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics: 
Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents, 39 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 332, 343 (2015) (reporting that study participants undervalued 
shoeprint evidence relative to Bayesian norms); William C. Thompson et al., Do Jurors Give 
Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification Evidence?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 359, 
359 (2013) (reporting that DNA study participants made judgments “consistent with 
Bayesian expectations, although people overvalued the DNA evidence when the probability 
of a false report of a match was high relative to the random match probability”). 
106  Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics?, 25 LAW 
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presentation protocols that are designed to maximize jurors’ understanding 
of the probative value of the evidence, reduce the risk of probabilistic 
fallacies (such as the source probability error107 or the prosecutor’s 
fallacy108), and move jurors’ relevant beliefs in normatively appropriate 
amounts. 
A study that addresses these issues will necessarily have rather low 
ecological validity109 because actual cases rarely translate directly into a 
normative scenario.  An actual criminal case will typically include so many 
different considerations (e.g., eyewitness testimony, evidence that 
impeaches that testimony, evidence about motives and opportunity, alibi 
evidence, etc.) that it would be impossible to determine the exact amount by 
which evidence of a forensic science “match” should influence a juror’s 
judgment about a defendant’s guilt or innocence. 
Still, a number of researchers have constructed artificial legal scenarios 
that permit comparison of jurors’ judgments with Bayesian norms.  For 
example, Professor William Thompson and his colleagues have offered a 
useful paradigm for eliciting probabilistic estimates from mock jurors in 
simple cases involving forensic science evidence.110  In this Bayesian 
paradigm, the relevant information is constrained in ways that allow the 
researcher to determine whether mock jurors are undervaluing or 
overvaluing forensic evidence.111  Informed by the findings of Study 13 
regarding the different ways that forensic scientists present their findings, 
future studies could use Professor Thompson’s approach to pit each of a 
 
& HUM. BEHAV. 493, 508–10 (2001); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the 
Courtroom: How to Make DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2001); Jonathan J. Koehler & Laura Macchi, Thinking About Low-
Probability Events: An Exemplar-Cuing Theory, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 540 (2004) (finding that 
people were less persuaded by low probability DNA evidence when it was presented in an 
example-friendly way than when it was not). 
107  Koehler, supra note 100, at 22 (identifying the source probability as the error that 
occurs when one equates the random match probability (RMP)—the probability that a 
randomly selected person will match by coincidence—with the probability that a matching 
defendant is not the source of the forensic evidence); Thompson & Newman, supra note 105, 
at 335. 
108  William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical 
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 171 (1987) (identifying the 
prosecutor’s fallacy as the error that occurs when one equates the RMP with the probability 
that a matching defendant is not guilty).  
109  The ecological validity of a study refers to how well the experimental setting mimics 
real world settings of interest.  See Jonathan J. Koehler & John B. Meixner, Jury Simulation 
Goals, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURIES: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR 
THE FUTURE (Margaret Bull Kovera, ed.) (forthcoming). 
110  Thompson & Newman, supra note 105; Thompson et al., supra note 105, at 360–62. 
111  Thompson & Newman, supra note 105, at 347. 
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series of different approaches against one another to determine which ones 
most reliably produce Bayesian-appropriate responses. 
CONCLUSION 
The movement to reform the forensic sciences is well under way.  The 
National Commission on Forensic Science will likely take steps to reinforce 
the recommendations in the 2009 NAS report to eliminate some obviously 
unscientific forensic science practices.  For example, we are approaching 
the end of exaggerated 100% certainty and 0% error rate claims.  Testimony 
about having individualized a marking to its one and only source in the 
world to the exclusion of all others will likely also disappear.  Some of the 
weaker subfields, such as hair microscopy and bite mark analysis seem 
destined to join comparative bullet lead analysis, voiceprint identification, 
and arson “indicators” in the forensic science trash heap.112  There may be a 
push to take testimony only from certified forensic examiners who work in 
accredited laboratories.  Procedural changes that reduce the risk of 
cognitive bias, such as the use of sequential unmasking and blind verifiers, 
may take hold.  Similarly, there are efforts under way to increase the 
independence of laboratories from law enforcement to help reduce 
prosecutorial bias that some claim infects the forensic sciences.113 
Such reforms are a good start, but they are not enough.  The most 
important reform, in our view, is one that would imbue the entire forensic 
science enterprise with a research culture.  This idea was developed most 
thoroughly in a UCLA Law Review article that was co-authored by a broad 
and diverse group of people who have written widely about the forensic 
sciences.114  Adoption of a research culture entails a commitment to 
conducting, participating in, and relying upon high quality empirical 
research.  Research is needed to address such fundamental issues as what 
 
112  Michael J. Saks & Ashley M. Votruba, “. . . and the Courts Have Been Utterly 
Ineffective,” 54 JUDGES’ J. 28 (2015) (“In recent years, a number of forensic science 
technique have been found to be so lacking in validity that they have been laid to rest . . . .”); 
see also ECKHOLM, supra note 10. 
113  ROGER KOPPL, REASON FOUND., CSI FOR REAL: HOW TO IMPROVE FORENSICS 
SCIENCE 6 (2007), http://reason.org/files/d834fab5860d5cf4b3949fecf86d3328.pdf (“About 
80 percent of all U.S. crime labs are within law enforcement agencies, and approximately 90 
percent of the accredited ones are organized under police agencies.”); Simon A. Cole, 
Response: Forensic Science Reform: Out of the Laboratory and into the Crime Scene, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 123, 130 (2013) (“Laboratory independence has long been perhaps the chief 
proposed reform among those American scholars who have been engaged in work calling for 
forensic reform.”). 
114  Jennifer Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 725 (2011).  
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the various forensic methods can achieve, how reliably they can achieve 
them, and under what conditions.115  Adoption of a research culture would 
also entail transparency, an “ongoing critical perspective,” and a 
willingness to change and adapt that is different from how the forensic 
sciences have traditionally operated.116 
Here we note that a call for empirical studies in the forensic sciences to 
assess their respective degrees of reliability117 should not be confused with a 
claim that the forensic science methods used today are unreliable.  
Unproven is not the same as unreliable.  As attorney and Harvard doctoral 
candidate Nathan J. Robinson recently wrote, “the problem with forensic 
science is not that it is wrong, but that it is hard to know when it is right.”118  
The problem Robinson points out is compounded by the fact that people 
apparently believe, quite strongly and with little justification, that forensic 
science is hardly ever wrong.  As is true in all areas of scientific evidence, 
the burden of demonstrating threshold reliability—and providing decision 
makers with scientific information about error and accuracy rates—rests 
with the evidentiary proponent.  We hope that some of the studies we 
propose will help address this burden.119 
 
115  Id. at 740 (explaining that a research culture is one “in which the question of the 
relationship between research-based knowledge and laboratory practices is both 
foregrounded and central. We mean a culture in which the following questions are primary: 
What do we know? How do we know that? How sure are we about that?  We mean a culture 
in which these questions are answered by reference to data, to published studies, and to 
publicly accessible materials, rather than primarily by reference to experience or craft 
knowledge, or simply assumed to be true because they have long been assumed to be true.”). 
116  Id. at 743–44.  The thoughtful historian of science Professor Simon Cole offers a 
somewhat different perspective on moving toward a scientific culture in forensic science.  
He says that the culture we should want has more to do with carefulness, documentation, and 
honesty than it does with traditional scientific values like testing hypotheses or adopting a 
skeptical mindset.  See Simon A. Cole, Acculturating Forensic Science: What Is “Scientific 
Culture,” and How Can Forensic Science Adopt It?, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 435, 457 (2010) 
(In evidence collection, “the main concern is that we want people who are careful, 
meticulous, and honest.”). 
117  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (September 2016) (calling for rigorous studies to assess the 
foundational validity and accuracy of many forensic sciences). 
118  Wesley Vernon et al., Should We Trust Forensic Science?, BOSTON REVIEW  
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/vernon-nirenberg-respond-robinson-
forensic-pseudoscience; see also Nathan J. Robinson, Forensic Pseudoscience, BOSTON 
REVIEW (Nov. 16, 2015), http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/nathan-robinson-forensic-
pseudoscience-criminal-justice. 
119  The goal of much of the descriptive research we propose is not necessarily to 
improve the practice of forensic science, though this is a potential side benefit.  A more 
central goal is to provide a set of empirical findings that will inform consumers of forensic 
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Finally, we join former U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner in 
calling for the judiciary to join the forensic reform party by requiring 
greater participation from the forensic science community.120  It is not 
enough for trial judges to hold occasional Daubert hearings to assess the 
reliability of proffered forensic science evidence if those judges continue to 
rely on the unsupported claims of forensic science supporters rather than the 
results of high quality empirical research conducted by disinterested 
scientists.  As Judge Gertner opined in United States v. Green,121 in the 
context of toolmark evidence, “[t]he more courts admit this type of 
toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency testing, or 
evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we should 
require more.”122  We agree, and hope that we have provided some 
constructive suggestions as to what more could and should be done by way 
of scientific testing. 
  
 
science information about the value and limits of forensic science evidence. 
120  Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 790 (2011) (“Until courts address the deficiencies in the 
forensic sciences—until courts do what Daubert  . . .  requires that they do—there will be no 
meaningful change here.”). 
121  405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005). 
122  Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 109; Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret), Opinions I Should Have 
Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 437 (2016) (More recently, Judge Gertner stated that she 
wished she had excluded the ballistics testimony in Green altogether, rather than merely 
limiting it). 
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